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What Makes Professors Appear Credible: The Effect of Demographic
Characteristics and Ideological Beliefs
Luke (Lei) Zhu
University of Manitoba
Karl Aquino
University of British Columbia
Abhijeet K. Vadera
Singapore Management University
Five studies are conducted to examine how ideology and perceptions regarding gender, race, caste, and
affiliation status affect how individuals judge researchers’ credibility. Support is found for predictions
that individuals judge researcher credibility according to their egalitarian or elitist ideologies and
according to status cues including race, gender, caste, and university affiliation. Egalitarians evaluate
low-status researchers as more credible than high-status researchers. Elitists show the opposite pattern.
Credibility judgments affect whether individuals will interpret subsequent ambiguous events in accor-
dance with the researcher’s findings. Effects of diffuse status cues and ideological beliefs may be
mitigated when specific status cues are presented to override stereotypes.
Keywords: demographics, ideology, social cognition, social dominance, status
“The eye sees only what the mind is prepared to comprehend”
—Robertson Davies
Greek mythology tells the story of Procrustes who kept a house
by the side of the road where he enticed weary travelers to spend
the night. Unfortunately for his guests, Procrustes was obsessed
with symmetry and so he built a special bed for them upon which
he implemented his unique program for pursuing this goal. If his
guests were too long to fit the bed, he hacked off their legs. If they
were too short, he stretched them on the rack. Procrustes’s desire
to create a world where everyone is the same height is a meta-
phorical example of egalitarianism, which can be defined as a
system of beliefs that justifies and advocates efforts to increase
social, economic, and political equality among individuals and
groups. Egalitarian ideas underlie several political and economic
systems including socialism, communism, feminism, and welfare
liberalism (Tawney, 1952; Dworkin, 2002). Egalitarianism has had
its share of critics (e.g., Hayek, 1960; Kirk, 1999), but its influence
on modern organizational practices is undeniable. For example,
policies like Affirmative Action, the minimum wage, and work-
place democracy are all influenced by egalitarian principles.
The antithesis of egalitarianism is elitism, a competing belief
system that tolerates and even prefers a social order that grants
greater privilege, esteem, opportunity, and wealth to certain indi-
viduals or groups. Elitism has a long history in political and social
thought dating at least to The Republic, in which Plato (trans.
1964) visualizes an ideal political community led by a small cadre
of philosopher kings. Studies of human societies around the world
show that as groups become large and complex they tend to
become hierarchically stratified (Pinker, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Elitism has been defended as an inevitable outcome of
differences in endowed abilities and motivations and the most
effective way for directing individual talent to benefit the group
(Henry, 1994; Nietzsche, 1887/1967). However, various forms of
elitism like aristocracy, plutocracy, and oligarchy have also been
vigorously attacked (Marx, 1966). But elitist ideas continue to
influence organizational culture and management practice. For
example, merit pay, performance ranking, and the selective recruit-
ment of job candidates from privileged social backgrounds (Ri-
vera, 2015) are all guided by elitist principles. Over the years,
political scientists, sociologists, and philosophers have devoted
considerable attention to exploring how egalitarian and elitist
belief systems, which we will refer to broadly as ideologies, affect
society. In this paper, we examine a consequence of these ideol-
ogies at the level of individual psychology by testing whether and
how they influence peoples’ judgments of an academic research-
er’s credibility. We chose to focus on this outcome for three
reasons.
First, academic scholars publish approximately 1.8 million ar-
ticles yearly in more than 25,000 journals (Ware & Mabe, 2012).
However, the public rarely reads the articles. Instead, TV, radio,
newspapers, websites, blogs, and Twitter feeds typically dissemi-
nate academic research. If scholars conduct research to inform,
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educate, and influence the public, it is useful to know when and
how nonacademic audiences incorporate the facts and insights
their work generates into their daily lives. Second, a researcher’s
credibility can determine whether audiences will accept their find-
ings as valid. Credibility is defined as “capable of being believed”
or “having or deserving credit or repute” (Credibility, 1991).
Academic researcher credibility therefore depends on whether
audiences perceive researchers as possessing the knowledge, abil-
ity, and competence to make accurate scientific claims.1 If audi-
ences believe these claims, it is reasonable to assume they are more
likely to rely on them to formulate policy, support certain political
or social causes, or guide their management philosophies. Finally,
prior theory and research suggests that academic credibility judg-
ments can be influenced by both ideological beliefs and a research-
er’s demographic characteristics. Consequently, examining this
outcome allowed us to test a general model of how people use
various inputs to make social judgments.
A number of studies suggest that characteristics which should
have little or no bearing on whether a researcher is judged as
credible, such as their physical attractiveness (Horai, Naccari, &
Fatoullah, 1974; Maddux & Rogers, 1980), age (Leippe & Ro-
manczyk, 1989; Ross, Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci, 1990), and de-
mographic similarity to the perceiver (Feldman, 1984), do in fact
influence such judgments. Other visible characteristics like re-
searcher race and gender should also have limited diagnostic value,
but they too have been found to influence credibility and compe-
tence evaluations (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Glick &
Fiske, 2001; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). For example, Hendrix
(1997) found that students questioned the competence of Black
professors more often than they questioned the competence of
White professors. Similarly, Harlow (2003) interviewed Black
professors and found that 76% reported that students challenged
their credibility. However, the effects of race are not uniform
across studies. Patton (1999) reported that students gave higher
credibility ratings to African American than to European American
instructors. Studies using gender to predict credibility judgments
have also produced equivocal findings (Glascock & Ruggiero,
2006). Feldman (1992, 1993) concluded that gender does not
influence academic credibility, but Hargett (1999) showed that
students rate men instructors as having higher credibility than
women instructors. Similarly, MacNell, Driscoll, and Hunt (2014)
showed that when students thought their instructor was a man, they
evaluated him more favorably than they evaluated an instructor
who they thought was a woman.
A limitation of past studies is that they oversimplify social
judgment processes by failing to consider evaluators’ beliefs and
cognitive predispositions as inputs. Basic to human cognition is the
idea that social judgments are a product of external stimuli and
internal desires, motives, preferences, and unconscious processes
that shape people’s mental representations of the world (Hastie &
Dawes, 2010; Kunda, 1990). Accordingly, we incorporate ideo-
logical beliefs into a model of credibility judgment that includes
the inputs of researcher race and gender.
We hypothesize that people who are strongly committed to
egalitarian or elitist ideologies will judge academic researchers
differently depending on whether these researchers belong to high-
or low-status demographic groups. Drawing from status charac-
teristic theory (Hembroff & Myers, 1984; Humphreys & Berger,
1981), we also hypothesize that these differences in judgment can
be negated if perceivers have additional status information about
the researcher’s qualifications. Our model should explain how
target status and perceiver ideology jointly influence social judg-
ments other than credibility so our research contributes more
broadly to the study of motivated cognition (Kruglanski & Web-
ster, 1996; Kunda, 1990). Following other motivated cognition
theorists (e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell,
2014; Crawford, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,
2003; Gu, McFerran, Aquino, & Kim, 2014), we propose that
ideology motivates individuals to process social information in a
way that allows them to sustain a coherent and legitimate world-
view.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske et al.,
1999, 2002; Glick & Fiske, 2001) provides a basis for predicting
that a researcher’s race and gender can influence how people judge
their academic credibility. The model proposes that perceived
status activates a stereotype that members of high-status groups
(e.g., men, Whites) are more competent than members of low-
status groups (e.g., women, Blacks). Supporting this claim, sam-
ples drawn from the United States, Europe, and Asia showed
competence stereotypes to correlate .63 to .89 with demographic
status; most showed correlation greater than .80 (Cuddy et al.,
2009). Although research on the stereotype content model has
typically focused on the structural correlates and universality of
the status  competence stereotype, ideological beliefs have been
found to influence stereotype expression. One study showed that
people who embrace hierarchy-enhancing elitism are more moti-
vated to endorse the status  competence stereotype than those
who embrace hierarchy-attenuating egalitarianism (Oldmeadow &
Fiske, 2007). Extending this finding, we show that motivational
processes influence whether audiences use the status  compe-
tence stereotype even when they are presented with information,
such as a target’s having PhD, that presumably signal competence.
However, we also show that holding certain ideological beliefs can
reverse the direction of this stereotype. Finally, we show that
exposure to other status cues can neutralize these effects.
One function of ideological beliefs is that they help people meet
an existential need to legitimize apparent social inequalities (Jost
& Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and maintain a belief
in ultimate justice (Lerner, 1980). As a result, ideological beliefs
can motivate individuals to interpret social facts in ways that
support their views. For example, strongly committed elitists
would find it supportive of their ideology to stereotype high-status
individuals as more competent than low-status individuals. Indeed,
Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007) found that elitists judged people
who live in large, expensive homes with swimming pools as more
competent than those who live in small, inexpensive homes. Sim-
ilarly, we hypothesize that as people become increasingly elitist,
they will judge researchers from high-status demographic groups
as more credible than researchers from low-status demographic
1 We distinguish credibility from trustworthiness which indicates truth-
fulness (Fiske & Dupree, 2014; Hovland, Janie, & Kelley, 1953; Petty &
Wegener, 1998). Sources might be perceived as highly capable but possi-
bly untrustworthy in regard to scientific accuracy.
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863ACADEMIC CREDIBILITY
groups. This prediction is consistent with many studies showing
that people who are high in social dominance orientation (SDO), a
psychological construct that captures “the degree to which indi-
viduals desire and support a group-based hierarchy and the dom-
ination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ groups” (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999, p. 48), are negatively biased toward low-status
groups (e.g., Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009; Sidanius,
Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Umphress, Simmons, Boswell, & Triana,
2008; Unzueta, Knowles, & Ho, 2012).
The endorsement of SDO beliefs aligns with an elitist prefer-
ence for preserving group-based social hierarchies whereas reject-
ing them aligns with minimizing hierarchies, which is the hallmark
of egalitarianism (Duckitt, 2001; Ho et al., 2015; Rabinowitz,
Wittig, von Braun, Franke, & Zander-Music, 2005). Thus, we used
the well-validated SDO scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &
Malle, 1994) as our primary measure of egalitarianism or elitism in
our studies. It is interesting to note that a review of the SDO
literature shows that relatively few studies have explicitly exam-
ined how rejecting SDO beliefs affects social judgment (Um-
phress, Smith-Crowe, Brief, Dietz, & Watkins, 2007). Although
some studies show that rejecting these beliefs had no effect on
social judgments (Knowles et al., 2009; Oldmeadow & Fiske,
2007), one study showed that men and Whites who reject SDO
prefer employers who give low-status members access to power
positions (Umphress et al., 2007). This finding led the researchers
to suggest that individuals “who are low in SDO are attracted to
lower status groups, just as those who are high in SDO show an
opposite pull toward higher status groups” (Umphress et al., 2007,
p. 405). We test their conjecture by hypothesizing that as people
become more committed to egalitarianism they are more likely to
judge low-status researchers as more credible than high-status
researchers. We base this argument on the notion that egalitarians,
like elitists, also need to legitimize the social system (Jost et al.,
2003) and believe in a just world (Lerner, 1980). For extreme
egalitarians, though, it is unlikely that this idealized socially equal
world has been realized to their satisfaction (Kay et al., 2007). One
way they can assuage their “ideological dissonance” at being
confronted by lingering inequality is by psychologically elevating
the status of minorities and the disadvantaged (Kay & Jost, 2003).
The SDO literature suggests that elitists can legitimize the status
quo by celebrating society’s “winners” and derogating its “losers”
(victim derogation; e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000; Overbeck, Jost,
Mosso, & Flizik, 2004). In contrast, evidence suggests that egal-
itarians can legitimize the system by valorizing losers and deval-
uing winners (victim enhancement; Gu et al., 2014; Kay & Jost,
2003; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005) through complementary stereo-
typing (Kay et al., 2007). A familiar example of complementary
stereotyping is the frequently observed stereotype of women as
communal but not agentic and men as agentic but not communal
(Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Glick & Fiske, 2001). Complementary
stereotypes legitimize the social system and maintain an illusion of
equality by reassuring the person who applies them that no single
group monopolizes desirable or undesirable attributes (Kay et al.,
2007). This stereotype is functional because desirable and unde-
sirable attributes associated with each group cancel each other out,
thus supporting a belief in a “level playing field” for everyone.
Although victim derogation or victim enhancement can satisfy
the system justification motive, we propose that egalitarians will
lean more toward victim enhancement. They will choose this path
because it allows them to “legitimize the status quo without
unequivocally stigmatizing any group” (Kay & Jost, 2003, p. 825).
In other words, egalitarians can elevate low-status groups vis-a`-vis
high-status groups, while persuading themselves that they are
denigrating no one. It is beyond the scope of our research to
determine whether this process is conscious or unconscious, but
previous studies suggest it is probably nonconscious (Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Nosek, Banaji, &
Greenwald, 2002). In either case, we hypothesize that that re-
searcher demographic characteristics such as race and gender will
influence egalitarians to judge their credibility in a direction op-
posite to that of elitists:
Hypothesis 1: Egalitarians will be more likely to evaluate a
low-status researcher as more credible than a high-status re-
searcher whereas elitists will show the opposite pattern.
We now draw from status characteristic theory (Berger, Cohen,
& Zelditch, 1972; Ridgeway, 2001) to argue that if perceivers are
presented with individuating characteristics associated with re-
searcher competence, demographic attributes and ideology will
exert less influence on credibility judgments (Bunderson & Barton,
2011; Hembroff & Myers, 1984; Humphreys & Berger, 1981).
Specific Versus Diffuse Status Cues
Status characteristics theory distinguishes between types of sta-
tus cues (Hembroff & Myers, 1984; Humphreys & Berger, 1981).
Demographic characteristics such as race and gender are called
diffuse cues, which “tend to be grounded in broad stereotypes
about the superiority of particular social categories and social
institutions as well as questionable assumptions about the extent to
which general ability predicts specific task performance” (Bunder-
son & Barton, 2011, p. 220). In contrast, specific cues such as
job-relevant experience, specialized degrees, or awards are domain
specific, are more proximal to the actual subject domain, and
generally more accurate predictors of competence. When both cues
are available, specific cues will more powerfully determine expec-
tations (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988;
Hembroff & Myers, 1984; Humphreys & Berger, 1981). For
example, Rosette and Tost (2010, Study 2) found that top women
leaders (e.g., senior executive vice president) received higher
leadership ratings than midlevel women managers (e.g., division
manager): when diffuse cues (woman, incongruent with the leader
role) and specific cues (top leader, congruent with leader role)
were available, specific cues superseded diffuse cues. We extend
these findings by incorporating perceiver ideologies into the cog-
nitive process that leads to social judgment in the presence of
diffuse and specific status cues. We propose that specific status
cues signaling competence in a given domain can neutralize the
joint effects of researchers’ demography and perceivers’ ideolo-
gies because they differentiate the researcher from their corre-
sponding positive or negative demographic stereotype.
Hypothesis 2: Researcher status, perceiver political ideology,
and specific status cues will interact such that in the absence
of specific cues, researcher status and perceiver ideology will
jointly predict researcher credibility whereas in the presence
of specific cues, status and ideology will not jointly predict
researcher credibility.
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864 ZHU, AQUINO, AND VADERA
Effects of Credibility Judgments
We expect judgments of researcher credibility to influence
how people process subsequent information that is open to
multiple interpretations. Specifically, they should do so in a
way that is consistent with the researcher’s claims. For exam-
ple, if a researcher reports evidence that organizations practice
racial or gender discrimination, people who judge the re-
searcher as credible should be more likely to perceive discrim-
ination in an ambiguous social situation. Since we argue that
researcher status and perceiver political ideology affect percep-
tions of researcher credibility, we hypothesize a moderated
mediation model in which researcher status interacts with per-
ceiver ideology to predict researcher credibility, which in turn
predicts the perceiver’s interpretation of subsequent social stim-
uli:
Hypothesis 3: Researcher status will interact with perceiver
political ideology to indirectly predict perceivers’ interpreta-
tions of subsequent, ambiguous events through researcher
credibility as a mediating variable.
Overview of Studies
We conducted five studies to Test Hypotheses 1–3. We
operationalized researcher demographic status for race (White,
Black, and Asian), gender (man and woman), or caste (high and
low). In all studies, we presented participants with an online
newspaper article describing the results of a research study to
be published in an academic journal. The article included a
photograph of the researcher and the researcher’s comments
about the findings. We measured participants’ SDO in all
studies. In Studies 2 and 3, we tested whether judgments of
researcher credibility influenced interpretations of ambiguous
organizational and social events (Hypothesis 3). In Study 5, we
presented participants with specific status cues to signal the
researcher’s domain-related competence to Test Hypothesis 2.
Across all five studies, we found evidence supporting the hy-
potheses. Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of our model
and the hypotheses tested in each study.
Study 1
Sample and Procedure
A total of 260 participants agreed to take part in Study 1, but 252
(158 men) completed it. Participants averaged 38 years old (SD 
18); 14 years of work experience; 91 self-identified as White. We
recruited all participants from the United States using Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk) and paid them $0.25 after the experiment.
When participants clicked the study link, they received an
informed consent form followed by a cover letter explaining that
the study was to investigate how people process information
reported in the news media. The study used a 2  2 between-
subjects design in which researcher race (White vs. Asian) and
gender (man vs. woman) were manipulated. In this and all subse-
quent studies participants were randomly assigned to the experi-
mental conditions.2 In all conditions, the article described the
researcher as a member of the Faculty of Business at the Univer-
sity of Victoria. We made researcher race and gender salient by
embedding in the text a 6 cm  5 cm color photograph of a White
man, White woman, Asian man, or Asian woman to replicate how
images often appear in online or print newspaper articles.3 All
2 The on-line program (Qualtrics) used to collect data for this study
misspecified the random assignment procedure, causing the sample sizes in
each cell to be unequal although all participants were randomly assigned.
Thus, the program randomly assigned 35% (65%) of the participants to the
man (woman) researcher condition and 59% (41%) of the participants to
the White (Asian) researcher condition. However, unequal cell sizes should
not be particularly concerning when the analyses are based on the general
linear model approach, which is quite robust to variations in cell sizes
(Smith, 2014).
3 Photos were not pretested for physical attractiveness. However, our
post hoc test found that participants evaluated the White woman as more
attractive than the other three researchers and the Asian man as less
attractive than the other three researchers. Attractiveness ratings did not
differ significantly between the White man and the Asian woman. Judg-
ments of source credibility have been positively related to source physical
attractiveness (e.g., Horai et al., 1974), so we maintain that differences in
perceived attractiveness cannot explain our findings. If they did, the White
woman would be the most credible researcher, but she was not. In addition,
we replicated the Study 1findings in Studies 3, 4, and 5, in which all
pictures were pretested, which further strengthens our conclusion that
attractiveness does not explain our Study 1 findings.
Figure 1. Graphic depiction of hypotheses and studies.
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865ACADEMIC CREDIBILITY
researchers appeared to be 30 to 40 years old. We named research-
ers appropriately for gender and ethnicity. The White man was
identified as David Hormel; the White woman was named Andrea
Hormel; the Asian man was named Ho Yew Kee, and the Asian
woman was named Ho Yew Min.
The newspaper article was adapted from a real article that
appeared in a Canadian newspaper (Dhillon, 2009; available on
request). The article reported a study showing that customers
discriminate against ethnic minority and women employees when
rating service quality (Hekman et al., 2010). It included an inter-
view with one of the “researchers” who advocated for greater
workplace equality. The article stated that the study findings were
to be published in the Academy of Management Journal. The
article content was held constant across all experimental condi-
tions except for the manipulation of the race and the gender of the
researcher interviewed. After participants read the article, they
completed the credibility measure, followed by the SDO measure.
Finally, participants answered questions assessing their demo-
graphic background.
Measures
Researcher credibility. We measured credibility judgments
by asking: “How credible is the researcher interviewed in this
article?” and “Do you think the researcher interviewed is highly
qualified to do research?” Participants responded using a 7-point
Likert scale (1  not at all, 7  very much so). The items were
highly correlated and were averaged to produce a reliable scale
(  .92).
Egalitarian versus elitist ideologies. We measured this con-
struct using the 16-item SDO scale developed by Pratto et al.
(1994). The scale consists of items that capture elitist hierarchy-
enhancement versus egalitarian hierarchy-attenuating ideological
beliefs. Sample elitist beliefs are “Inferior groups should stay in
their place,” and “It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance
in life than others.” Sample egalitarian beliefs are “All groups
should be given an equal chance in life” and “We should strive to
make incomes as equal as possible.” Participants indicated how
much they agreed with each statement on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 completely disagree, 7 completely agree). We then formed
a scale by averaging the items (  .96), and scored them such that
a high score indicated a preference for egalitarianism. This scoring
procedure differs from how most researchers typically report SDO
scores, but because we wanted to call attention to the motivational
processes of egalitarians our scoring approach permits us to illus-
trate the effects more clearly. This will become more apparent in
the figures depicting our findings.
Control variables. We controlled for participants’ race
(dummy coded, 0  non-White, 1  White) and gender (dummy
coded, 0  woman, 1  man) because participants might identify
more strongly with researchers of similar demographic back-
grounds and consequently judge them more credible.
Results
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations
for all study variables. We performed hierarchical regression to
analyze our data. We entered participant race and participant
gender in Step 1 and researcher race (dummy coded, 0  Asian,
1  White), researcher gender (dummy coded, 0  woman, 1 
man), and SDO (centered) in Step 2. We entered Researcher
Race  SDO interaction in Step 3, Researcher Gender  SDO
interaction in Step 4, and Researcher Race  Researcher Gender
interaction in Step 5. Finally, we entered a three-way Researcher
Gender  Researcher Race  SDO interaction in Step 6. Table 2
presents the results.
We also conducted supplementary analyses to see whether par-
ticipants who share demographic characteristics with the featured
researcher differ in their credibility judgments compared with
those who are demographically dissimilar. We entered two-way
interactions consisting of Participant Race  SDO and Researcher
Race  Participant Race into the model reported in Table 2. None
of the interactions explained significant incremental variance in
credibility perceptions. We then tested the three-way Researcher
Race  Participant Race  SDO interactions to see whether
researcher—participant similarities in race interacted with SDO to
predict credibility judgments. Again, the interaction did not ex-
plain significant variance beyond the predictors in our theoretical
model. Finally, to test whether participant gender interacted with
researcher gender and SDO to predict credibility, we entered
Participant Gender  SDO and Researcher Gender  Participant
Gender, and Researcher Gender Participant Gender SDO into
the model, and found that no interactions explained significant
incremental variance in judgments of researcher credibility.4
Table 2 shows that White researchers were judged as being less
credible than Asian researchers (B.56, SE .18, p .01) and
men were judged as being less credible than women (B  .68,
SE .22, p .01). However, these main effects were qualified by
a three-way Researcher Race  Researcher Gender  SDO inter-
action (R2  .02, p  .05). We decomposed the three-way
4 We conducted the same analysis for Studies 2–5, and found results
identical to those in Study 1; that is, no interactions involving participant
and researcher demographics explained significant incremental variance in
credibility judgments beyond the hypothesized interactions. Post hoc
power analyses (using GPower Version 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, &
Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that our
studies had adequate statistical power to detect such interactions as the
power of our studies was .99, .82, .79, .99, and .99 for Studies 1–5,
respectively. We did not test the five-way interaction in any studies where
we manipulated more than one researcher demographic as we would be
required to estimate a highly complex statistical model that arguably adds
little theoretical or practical value to our more parsimonious model. More-
over, recent research indicates that such complex models strain information
processing capacities and make it extremely difficult to derive theoretically
defensible hypotheses (Halford, Baker, McCredden, & Bain, 2005).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Participant gender 0.63 0.48 —
2. Participant race 0.75 0.43 .07 —
3. SDO 5.69 1.07 .08 .14 —
4. Researcher credibility 5.12 1.12 .08 .09 .06 —
Note. N  252. Political ideology was measured using social dominance
orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism.
For participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For participant race, 0 
non-White, 1  White.
 p  .05.
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866 ZHU, AQUINO, AND VADERA
interaction by researcher race to test the significance of the Re-
searcher Gender SDO interaction in each race condition. Results
showed that the Researcher Gender  SDO interaction was sig-
nificant when the researcher was White (R2  .08, p  .001) but
not when the researcher was Asian.
We explored the pattern of the interaction in this and all sub-
sequent studies by conducting regions of significance test using the
Johnson–Neyman technique (Hayes & Matthes, 2009; Johnson &
Neyman, 1936; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006; Spiller, Fitzsi-
mons, Lynch, & McClelland, 2013) in Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS
macro for SPSS (Model 1). We used this technique as an alterna-
tive to the traditional approach of analyzing interactions by testing
significance at a specific moderator value (which is usually an
arbitrary number of one standard deviation from the mean). The
latter approach has been criticized for failing to consider situations
in which the arbitrarily determined value is outside the range of the
data (e.g., when the moderator is skewed) or is not among the
observed values (e.g., when the moderator is measured on a coarse
scale; Spiller et al., 2013). In contrast, the Johnson–Neyman tech-
nique tests each observed value of the moderator to determine the
ranges at which the simple effect is significant and nonsignificant
at p  .05. The scores on a given scale that demarcate the ranges
are known as the Johnson–Neyman points (Spiller et al., 2013).
Although the Johnson–Neyman technique has been available for
some time, it is seldom used because of its computational com-
plexity. The introduction of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012)
has greatly reduced the computational complexity required to
estimate regions of significance, and so we used it in this and
subsequent studies to provide a clearer picture showing when
credibility judgments are significantly different as a function of
SDO and researcher demographics.
Figure 2 depicts Researcher Gender  SDO interaction and the
regions of significance at the high and low ends of the SDO scale.
In this and all subsequent graphs, the shaded areas indicate the
points in our measures of elitist versus egalitarian ideological
beliefs at which the effects of status variables on credibility judg-
ments become significant. The graphs also indicate the scores on
our measures that divide each region from another. Recall that a
higher SDO score indicates egalitarianism.
Figure 2 shows that researcher gender affects credibility judg-
ments as Hypothesis 1 predicted: egalitarians evaluated the White
woman as more credible than the White man (BJN  .68, SE 
.34, p  .05); elitists evaluated the White man as more credible
than the White woman (BJN  .71, SE  .36, p  .05).
Next, we decomposed the three-way interaction by researcher
gender to test the significance of the Researcher Race  SDO
interaction in each gender condition. The Researcher Race SDO
interaction was significant when the researcher was a man (R2 
.08, p .01) but not significant when the researcher was a woman.
Figure 3 graphically displays the interaction.
Again, supporting Hypothesis 1, Figure 3 shows that elitists
perceived the White man as more credible than the Asian man
(BJN  .51, SE  .26, p  .05); egalitarians perceived the Asian
man as more credible than the White man (BJN  .39, SE  .20,
p  .05).
Table 2
Study 1: Model Estimation Results for Predicting Joint Effect of SDO and Researcher’s Gender and Race on Perceived Credibility
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Participant race .22 (.16) .21 (.16) .22 (.16) .28 (.16) .25 (.16) .26 (.16)
Participant gender .18 (.14) .17 (.15) .19 (.15) .19 (.15) .19 (.15) .14 (.15)
Researcher gender .35 (.15) .37 (.15) .36 (.15) .69 (.22) .68 (.22)
Researcher race .33 (.14) .33 (.14) .38 (.14) .61 (.18) .56 (.18)
SDO .09 (.07) .16 (.10) .26 (.11) .31 (.11) .19 (.12)
Researcher Race  SDO .12 (.13) .13 (.13) .16 (.13) .05 (.16)
Researcher Gender  SDO .36 (.15) .37 (.15) .00 (.21)
Researcher Race  Researcher Gender .58 (.29) .60 (.29)
Researcher Race  Researcher Gender  SDO .70 (.28)
R2 .01 .06 .06 .08 .10 .12
R2 .05 .00 .02 .02 .02
Note. N  252. Political ideology was measured using social dominance orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism. For
participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For participant race, 0  non-White, 1  White. For researcher gender, 0  woman researcher, 1  man
researcher. For researcher race, 0  Asian researcher, 1  White researcher. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Figure 2. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Gender
interaction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which Researcher
Credibility differs significantly between the White Man and the White
Woman at p  .05. The outer border of the left shaded area represents the
lowest political ideology score in the sample and the outer border of the
right shaded area represents the highest political ideology score.
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867ACADEMIC CREDIBILITY
Discussion
Study 1 supports Hypothesis 1. Notably, egalitarians judged
women and ethnic minority researchers as more credible than men
and Whites even when participants read an article in which the
researcher advocated efforts to combat discrimination against
women and minorities. Egalitarians should endorse this goal and
so we might expect them to evaluate high- and low-status research-
ers equally. Yet despite potentially sharing similar beliefs as the
researcher, the researcher’s race or gender influenced their social
judgments as predicted by our motivated cognition model.
Our experiment included two Asian researchers, a minority
group often stereotyped as competent (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002),5
intelligent, capable, hardworking, mathematical, and self-
disciplined (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Maddux, Galinsky,
Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008), the “model minority . . . that tends to
do well educationally and economically, and . . . stays out of
trouble” (Maddux et al., 2008). Thus, we might expect our study
participants to evaluate the Asian and White researchers as equally
credible. Nevertheless, U.S. society still perceives Asians to be in
a subordinate position relative to Whites (Frantz et al., 2004). That
elitist participants evaluated an Asian man as less credible than a
White man supports this hierarchical perception and again con-
forms to our motivated cognition prediction.
The finding that egalitarians reverse the direction of group-
based judgments in favor of minorities and women is seldom
discussed in the intergroup relations literature (see Crawford,
2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009, for excep-
tions). Thus, we sought to replicate Study 1 and also test the
prediction that credibility judgments influence interpretations of
ambiguous events (Hypothesis 3).
Study 2
Sample and Procedures
We used MTurk to recruit 90 participants. Completing the study
were 83 (53 women), 57 White, averaging 31 years old (SD 10),
and 12 years of work experience. Study 2 was similar to Study 1
except we manipulated researcher gender and included a scenario
designed to assess perceptions of discrimination following the
article. Manipulating only researcher gender rather than both race
and gender disconnects the experimental manipulation (i.e., man
vs. woman) from the alleged targets of discrimination (i.e., Blacks)
in the subsequent judgment task. Participants were randomly as-
signed to read a version of Dhillon’s (2009) article in which either
a White male or White female researcher was interviewed (names
and pictures were identical to those in Study 1). Participants then
completed the researcher credibility measure and proceeded to an
unrelated second task where they read another article and an-
swered questions to assess whether they would interpret a poten-
tially ambiguous situation as discrimination. Finally, they com-
pleted the SDO measure and answered demographic questions.
Measures
Researcher credibility and ideology were measured as in Study
1. Cronbach’s alpha for researcher credibility and SDO measures
were .88 and .94, respectively.
Discrimination jugement. To assess the construal of ambiguity,
we adapted a scenario from Effron and Monin (2010) in which a
fictional news article reports that two Black employees sue a
White manager for promoting five White employees. The manager
claims that the promotions are based solely on merit, but the Black
employees claim to be equally qualified. Consequently, racial
discrimination is debatable in the scenario. Using a 7-point Likert
scale (1  not at all, 7  very much so), participants indicated
whether “This is a clear example of racial discrimination” and
“Obviously, the manager’s decision was biased.” We averaged the
items to form a scale (  .93); a higher score indicated high
discrimination judgment.
Control variable. We controlled for participants’ gender
(dummy coded, 0 woman, 1man), because participants might
evaluate a researcher more favorably because of social identifica-
tion or perceived similarity.
Results
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for all study
variables. We performed a hierarchical regression to Test Hypoth-
esis 1. We entered participant gender in Step 1, and researcher
gender (dummy coded, 0  woman, 1  man) and Participant
SDO (centered) in Step 2. In Step 3, we entered the Researcher
Gender  SDO interaction. Table 4 presents the results.
Table 4 shows that the Researcher Gender  SDO interaction
explained a significant amount of additional variance in perceived
credibility (R2  0.07, p  .05). Figure 4 shows the results of
significance tests.
Figure 4 shows that elitists evaluated the man as more credible
than the woman (BJN  1.23, SE  .62, p  .05), whereas
egalitarians reversed the pattern (BJN  .85, SE  .43, p  .05).
5 We conducted a pilot study to test this assumption. Based only on the
names, David Hormel and Ho Yew Kee, participants indicated general
academic research credibility. Using the researcher credibility measure
from Study 1, we found no significant difference between credibility
judgments for the Asian versus the White researcher, t(65)  0.68, p  ns.
Figure 3. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Race in-
teraction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which Researcher Cred-
ibility differs significantly between the White Man and the Asian Man at
p  .05. The outer border of the left shaded area represents the lowest
political ideology score in the sample and the outer border of the right
shaded area represents the highest political ideology score.
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868 ZHU, AQUINO, AND VADERA
This interaction replicates Study 1 findings and supports Hypoth-
esis 1.
Test of Mediation
We used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012) to Test
Hypothesis 2, in which Researcher Credibility was predicted to
mediate the relationship between the Researcher Gender  SDO
interaction and discrimination judgment. The PROCESS macro
involves the mediator model, the dependent variable model, and
the most important third model: the independent variable’s condi-
tional indirect effect on the dependent variable. The mediator
model tests the main and interactive effects of Researcher Gender
(as the independent variable) and SDO (as the moderator variable)
on Researcher Credibility (as the mediator), which is identical to
the earlier analysis in which we regressed Researcher Gender,
SDO, and Researcher Gender  SDO on Researcher Credibility.
The dependent model tests the effect of the mediator on the
dependent variable. Finally, using bootstrapping, the third model
estimates confidence intervals and tests for statistical significance
for the proposed conditional indirect effect of Researcher Gen-
der  SDO on discrimination judgment.
Results of the mediator model echo the results of the regression
analysis reported previously. The dependent variable model
showed a positive main effect of Researcher Credibility on Dis-
crimination Judgment (B  .42, SE  .21, p  .05). Most
importantly, the bootstrapped, bias-corrected and accelerated 95%
CI for the indirect effect of researcher gender among elitist par-
ticipants ranged from .03 to 1.06. Since the lower bound of the CI
is above zero, we concluded that elitists were more likely to
perceive discriminatory actions when the research reported was by
a man rather than a woman. For egalitarian participants, the CI
ranged from .71 to .04. The higher bound of the CI was below
zero; thus egalitarians were less likely to perceive discrimination
when a man rather than a woman conducted the study of discrim-
ination. The results support Hypothesis 3; researcher status and
perceiver political ideology interactively influence discrimination
judgment through researcher credibility.
Discussion
Study 2 supports Hypotheses 1 and 3 and replicates Study 1
results. In Study 3, we retested Hypotheses 1 and 3 by examining
how credibility judgments influenced interpretations of a real
event current at the time of data collection: the trial of George
Zimmerman, a White man who killed Trayvon Martin, a Black
man. Zimmerman claimed that Martin threatened his safety and
was acquitted, leading to protests and contentious public debates
about racial profiling, discrimination, and legal system fairness.
We examined whether judgments of researcher credibility regard-
ing a research study reporting workplace discrimination would
affect judgments about the Zimmerman verdict. We varied our
design to address the limitation of our first two studies being
cross-sectional. Study 3 was a lagged design: We collected data on
the key variables—researcher credibility judgments and SDO—in
separate waves without informing participants that the waves were
connected. This design minimized the possibility that answers to
measures of researcher credibility could influence answers to the
SDO scale and vice versa.
Study 3
Sample and Procedures
Participants were recruited from StudyResponse (Stanton &
Weiss, 2002), a nonprofit academic service that connects research-
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 2
Variable M SD 1 2 3
1. Participant gender 0.64 0.48 —
2. SDO 5.41 1.21 .02 —
3. Researcher credibility 5.04 1.14 .06 .16 —
Note. N  83. Political ideology was measured using social dominance
orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism.
For participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man.
Table 4
Study 2: Model Estimation Results for Predicting Joint Effect of
SDO and Researcher’s Gender on Perceived Credibility
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Participant gender .14 (.26) .20 (.28) .20 (.27)
Researcher gender .07 (.27) .06 (.26)
SDO .15 (.11) .45 (.17)
Researcher Gender  SDO .51 (.22)
R2 .00 .03 .10
R2 .03 .07
Note. N  83. Political ideology was measured using social dominance
orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism.
For participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For researcher gender, 0 
woman researcher, 1  man researcher. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
 p  .05.  p  .01.
Figure 4. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Gender
interaction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which Researcher
Credibility differs significantly between the Male and the Female Re-
searcher at p  .05. The outer border of the left shaded area represents the
lowest SDO score in the sample and the outer border of the right shaded
area represents the highest SDO score.
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869ACADEMIC CREDIBILITY
ers with more than 40,000 participants from 17 countries (Piccolo
& Colquitt, 2006; see studyresponse.syr.edu). Participants volun-
teered for the paid online study.
At Time 1, we recruited 112 participants: 63 men, 90 Caucasians,
averaging 38 years old (SD  7). Participants read Dhillon’s (2009)
article reporting findings by Hekman and colleagues (2010) and then
assessed researcher credibility. We manipulated researcher race
(White vs. Black) and gender using photos6 of a White man, White
woman, Black man, and Black woman as well as names stereotypi-
cally considered to indicate race and gender (David Hormel, Andrea
Hormel, Tyrone Williams, and Ebony Williams). After participants
completed the research credibility questions, they completed an “un-
related, tag-along” survey regarding the Trayvon Martin case (avail-
able on request), followed by several questions that assessed whether
they believed the acquittal indicated a biased jury. Participants re-
ported their demographic information.
Two weeks later, StudyResponse staff emailed participants who
completed the Time 1 study and asked them to complete a survey
on “values and personalities” (including the SDO scale), without
mentioning that they were being contacted because they completed
the first part of our study. The second portion drew 77 participants:
34 men, 50 Caucasians, average 38 years old (SD  7). Data from
Times 1 and 2 were matched with a unique ID code assigned to
each participant. They also completed another demographic ques-
tionnaire so we could verify our match process. Comparisons
between Times 1 and 2 showed no significant difference in terms
of age, gender, and ethnicity.
Measures
We measured ideology using SDO, as in our previous studies.
Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .83.
Researcher credibility. Our previous researcher credibility
measure showed high internal consistency and yielded consistent
findings across studies, but the 2-item measure might have failed
to tap competence judgments. Consequently, we added three items
for a revised 5-item credibility measure7: “How credible is the
researcher interviewed in this article?” “Do you think the re-
searcher interviewed is highly qualified to do research?” “Do you
think the researcher is highly competent?” “Do you believe the
researcher describes valid findings?” “Do you believe the re-
searcher’s findings are true?” Participants answered using a
7-point Likert scale (1  not at all, 7  very much). Their
responses were averaged to form a scale (  .93).
Judgment of the Zimmerman verdict. After reading the
summary of the Trayvon Martin case, participants indicated
whether the jury showed racial discrimination by acquitting Zim-
merman (1  strongly disagree, 7  strongly agree): “This is a
clear example of racial discrimination. “Obviously, the jury’s
decision was biased.” “The jury made a wrong decision to acquit
George Zimmerman.” “Trayvon Martin was a victim of racial
discrimination.” Answers were averaged to form a scale: high
scores indicated more perceived discrimination (  .94).
Control variables. We controlled for participants’ race
(dummy coded, 0  non-White, 1  White) and gender (dummy
coded, 0  woman, 1  man) because social identification or
perceived similarity might cause participants to evaluate a re-
searcher more favorably.
Results
Table 5 reports means, standard deviations, and correlations for
all study variables. We performed a hierarchical regression to Test
Hypothesis 1. We dummy coded researcher race (0  Black, 1 
White) and gender (0  woman, 1  man) and entered participant
race and gender in Step 1; researcher race, gender, and SDO
(centered) in Step 2; Researcher Race  SDO in Step 3; Re-
searcher Gender  SDO in Step 4; Researcher Race  Researcher
Gender in Step 5; and the three-way Researcher Race  Re-
searcher Gender  SDO interaction in Step 6. Table 6 shows the
regression results.
The Researcher Gender  SDO interaction explained a signif-
icant amount of additional variance in researcher credibility
(R2  .08, p  .05). Neither the Researcher Race  SDO
interaction nor the Researcher Race  Researcher Gender  SDO
interaction was significant. Figure 5 shows the interaction pattern
and Johnson–Neyman points of significance.
Consistent with our previous findings, Figure 5 shows that
egalitarian participants perceived the woman as more credible than
the man (BJN  .54, SE  .27, p  .05). The Johnson–Neyman
technique did not identify another region of significance of SDO in
which elitists perceived the man as more credible than the women
at p .05 level. However, examination of the data revealed that at
the minimum observed score of SDO (3.50) participants perceived
the man as more credible than the woman (BJN  .60, SE  .36),
although at a marginally significant level of p  .09.
We followed the procedure used in Study 2 to test whether
Researcher Credibility mediated the relationship between Re-
searcher Status  SDO and discrimination judgment of the Zim-
merman acquittal (i.e., Hypothesis 3). Results of the mediator
model are identical to those of regression analysis reported previ-
ously. Results of the dependent variable model revealed a positive
main effect of Researcher Credibility on the dependent variable
(B  .68, SE  .13, p  .001). Most importantly, the boot-
strapped, bias-corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect of the
interaction between researcher gender and perceiver SDO on judg-
ment of the acquittal for low SDO participants ranged from .01 to
6 Pictures were pretested to ensure that individual attractiveness did not
differ significantly across the four experimental conditions.
7 The original 2-item measure of researcher credibility gave the same
results.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 3
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Participant gender 0.57 0.50 —
2. Participant race 0.65 0.48 .10 —
3. SDO 4.44 0.84 .41 .09 —
4. Researcher credibility 5.35 0.99 .06 .24 .12 —
Note. Final N  77 (NTime 1  112). Political ideology was measured
using social dominance orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates
egalitarianism/elitism. For participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For
participant race, 0  non-White, 1  White. For researcher gender, 0 
woman researcher, 1  man researcher. For researcher race, 0  Black
researcher, 1  White researcher.
 p  .05.  p  .001.
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870 ZHU, AQUINO, AND VADERA
1.04, which excludes 0 and thus indicates that elitist participants
perceived more racial discrimination when the researcher was a
man. Egalitarian participants showed the opposite pattern; the
bootstrapped 95% CI ranged from .89 to .03 for high SDO
participants. Since the Researcher Gender  SDO interaction had
a nonsignificant direct effect on acquittal judgments, we conclude
that researcher credibility fully mediated the indirect effect. The
results support Hypothesis 3.
Discussion
Study 3 supported Hypotheses 1 and 3. However, in contrast to
Study 1, the results were supported for researcher gender but not
for race, perhaps because we started collecting data for Study 3 on
July 17, 2013, 4 days after the jury acquitted George Zimmerman
on all charges. The highly publicized discussion of racial issues
surrounding the case could have influenced participants to elevate
their credibility judgments of Black researchers to avoid appearing
prejudiced, regardless of their ideology, thus reducing the differ-
ence between high and low SDO.
Our first three studies were limited because the samples came
from so-called WEIRD societies (western, educated, industrial-
ized, rich, and democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).
WEIRD samples do not always represent how psychological vari-
ables operate elsewhere in the world. To determine whether our
findings would generalize to non-WEIRD societies, we conducted
Study 4 in India. The Study 4 design is similar to that of Studies
1–3, with a few notable exceptions. Study 4 uses caste, along with
gender, as a diffuse status characteristic. Historically, India’s caste
system socially stratifies individuals into thousands of hereditary
groups, with four broad categories: Brahmins, Kshatriyas,
Vaishyas, and Shudhras. Brahmins are the highest caste; Shudhras
are the lowest. We treat caste as a diffuse status characteristic
because individuals may be evaluated according to the broad
stereotypes associated with their caste.
We also used a different news article to control for the possi-
bility that our previous findings depend on the content of the
research findings rather than the hypothesized variables.
Study 4
Sample and Procedure
The sample included 200 participants (188 men), averaging 32
years old (SD  6). To recruit participants from India, we used a
market research firm that draws from a panel of approximately
10,000 blue- and white-collar workers in various industries in
various parts of India. Our caste manipulation was specific to a
region encompassing two cities in South India.
This study used a 2  2 between-subjects design in which
researcher caste (high vs. low) and gender (man vs. woman) were
manipulated. Participants first received a consent form followed by
a survey presenting the SDO scales. One week later they were
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. In
all conditions, participants read a BusinessNewsDaily.com article
(BusinessNewsDaily Staff, 2011) reporting a study rebutting the
Table 6
Study 3: Model Estimation Results for Predicting Joint Effect of SDO and Researcher’s Gender and Race on Perceived Credibility
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Participant race .58 (.24) .44 (.30) .43 (.31) .31 (.30) .33 (.30) .33 (.30)
Participant gender .19 (.20) .07 (.28) .04 (.28) .13 (.27) .18 (.28) .18 (.28)
Researcher race .12 (.26) .15 (.26) .17 (.26) .02 (.35) .02 (.35)
Researcher gender .13 (.24) .13 (.24) .16 (.23) .03 (.34) .04 (.36)
SDO .17 (.16) .07 (.31) .24 (.31) .21 (.31) .20 (.34)
Researcher Race  SDO .32 (.35) .24 (.34) .26 (.34) .25 (.40)
Researcher Gender  SDO .77 (.31) .69 (.32) .65 (.68)
Researcher Race  Researcher Gender .39 (.51) .40 (.52)
Researcher Race  Researcher Gender  SDO .05 (.77)
R2 .07 .07 .07 .15 .15 .15
R2 .00 .00 .08 .00 .00
Note. Final N  77 (NTime 1  112). Political ideology was measured using social dominance orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates
egalitarianism/elitism. For participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For participant race, 0  non-White, 1  White. For researcher gender, 0  woman
researcher, 1  man researcher. For researcher race, 0  Black researcher, 1  White researcher. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 p  .05.
Figure 5. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Gender
interaction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which Researcher
Credibility differs significantly between the White Man and the White
Woman at p  .05. Researcher Credibility differs significantly for the
elitist individuals at p  .09 level when political ideology  3.50, the
minimum observed political ideology score. The outer border of the right
shaded area represents the highest political ideology score.
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871ACADEMIC CREDIBILITY
first-mover advantage theory (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010). Par-
ticipants learned that the article would later appear in the Academy
of Management Journal. The content was held constant across all
experimental conditions except we manipulated caste and gender
of the researcher by interjecting caste- and gender-distinctive
names and photos8 into the article text. The high-caste man was
named Sridhar Iyengar and the high-caste woman was named
Laxmi Iyengar, both gender- and caste-distinctive names (Iyengar
indicates Hindu Brahmins of Tamil origin). The color photo of the
man showed white markings on his forehead; the color photo of
the woman showed white and red markings, both typical markings
for Brahmins. The low-caste man was named Ramesh Paraiyan;
the low-caste woman was named Hema Paraiyan, both caste- and
gender-distinctive names. Their color photos omitted the forehead
markings. In all four conditions, the researcher was described as a
member of the Indian Business School. Measures of credibility
judgments followed the newspaper article summary. The survey
concluded with demographic questions.
Measures
The 5-item measure of researcher credibility was identical to
that used in Study 3. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .70. SDO
was measured using the same 16-item scale (  .81).
Control variables. We controlled for caste (dummy coded,
0  low caste, 1  high caste) and gender (dummy coded, 0 
woman, 1  man) because social identification or perceived sim-
ilarity might cause participants to evaluate researchers more fa-
vorably.
Results
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics and correlations. We tested
whether we could replicate the interaction between researcher
status and SDO in the Indian context using hierarchical regression.
Table 8 presents the results.
The Researcher Caste SDO interaction explained a significant
amount of additional variance in researcher credibility (R2 .02,
p  .05). Figure 6 shows the interaction pattern.
Figure 6 shows that elitists perceived the high-caste researcher
as more credible than the low-caste researcher (BJN  .60, SE 
.30, p  .05). The Johnson–Neyman technique did not identify
another region of significance of SDO at which egalitarians per-
ceived the low-caste researcher as more credible than the high-
caste researcher. However, at the maximum observed score of
SDO in the sample (i.e., 4.89), egalitarian participants perceived
the low-caste researcher as more credible than the high-caste
researcher (B  .62, SE  .34), although at a marginal level of
significance of p  .07.
Discussion
Study 4 constructively replicates the previous three studies by
showing that caste, like gender and race, interacts with ideology to
predict judgments of researcher credibility. Because the sample
was from India, it also provides evidence of cross-cultural gener-
alizability.
In our final study, we tested whether specific status cues atten-
uate the interactive effect of researcher demographic status and
ideology (Hypothesis 2). We used another newspaper article to
provide even more evidence that our previous results did not
depend on the nature of the research being described.
In addition to measuring credibility judgments, we included
estimated performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) to
capture whether the researcher was perceived as being intellectu-
ally competent. The shifting standards model (Biernat, 1995; Bier-
nat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) sug-
gests that stereotypes can indirectly influence social judgments.
That is, people evaluate targets according to stereotypes associated
with social categories (e.g., man, woman, White, or Black). High-
status group members are stereotypically viewed as more compe-
tent than low-status group members. Consequently, individuals are
likely to judge competence for a low-status researcher based on the
expected range of competence among low-status group members
and to judge high-status researchers in reference to expectations
for high-status group members. Subjective rating scales such as
Likert-type scales, semantic differentials, or “any rating system in
which the units of judgment have no ties to external reality,”
further exacerbate potential bias in assessing “true” competence
(Biernat & Fuegen, 2001, p. 708), because participants can inter-
pret anchors on subjective scales differently to fit the context. Thus
they might subjectively evaluate targets from different social cat-
egories based on entirely different standards. Since we measured
researcher credibility with a Likert-type scale in our previous
studies, in Study 5 we sought to avoid shifting standards by using
“an externally anchored, common rule scale consisting of judg-
ment units that maintain a constant meaning across contexts and/or
types of targets” (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001, p. 708). SAT scores
qualify as common rule scale.
Study 5
Sample and Procedures
We recruited 200 participants (109 women, 167 Whites) from
MTurk and 100 undergraduate students (54 women, 52 Whites)
from a large public university in western Canada. A total of 290
8 As with Study 3, the photos were pretested to ensure that attractiveness
did not differ significantly across the four experimental conditions.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 4
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Participant caste 0.28 0.45 —
2. Participant gender 0.94 0.25 .16 —
3. SDO 3.60 0.73 .53 .16 —
4. Researcher credibility 5.62 1.22 .37 .20 .46 —
Note. N  200. Political ideology was measured using social dominance
orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism.
For participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For participant caste, 0 
low caste, 1  high caste.
 p  .05.  p  .01.
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872 ZHU, AQUINO, AND VADERA
participants completed the study9; 76% self-identified as White,
averaging 30-years-old (SD  12). Study 5 used a slightly mod-
ified version of a news article (Beltrame, 2014) reporting research
findings suggesting that taxing the wealthy does not hurt the
economy. Study 5 adopted a 2  2 between-subjects design in
which we manipulated researcher race (White man vs. Black man)
and specific status cue: high-status institutional affiliation (HSI)
versus moderate-status institutional affiliation (MSI). Again, par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental
conditions, with an identical news article but different researcher
in each condition. Researcher race was manipulated using the same
White- and Black-associated names (David Hormel vs. Tyrone
Williams) and photos as in Study 3. We manipulated researcher
status by indicating that the researcher was either a Harvard (HSI
condition) or Clemson University (MSI condition) professor.10 We
selected those institutions because a recent U.S. News and World
Report ranked Harvard #2 and Clemson #62 among 202 U.S.
universities under the National Universities category. As with
previous studies, participants were instructed to first read the
article and then assess the researcher’s credibility. The study ended
with demographic questions.
Measures
We measured SDO with the same SDO scale used in previous
studies (  .94). Researcher credibility was measured using the
5-item scale from Studies 3 and 4 (  .92).
SAT performance. We asked participants to estimate the
researcher’s percentile score on the SAT, a procedure that has been
used to assess perceptions of competence and that has been sug-
gested as being less susceptible to shifting standards effects (Bier-
nat, 1995; Biernat & Fuegen, 2001). In case some participants
were unfamiliar with the SAT, the instructions included a brief
introduction to the SAT.
Control variable. We controlled for participants’ race
(dummy coded, 0  non-White, 1  White), because they might
evaluate researchers more favorably because of social identifica-
tion or perceived similarity.
9 Data collected from the two samples were aggregated because a
regression analysis showed that the source of data had no significant main
or interactive effects on the outcome variables.
10 Participants in the undergraduate sample were asked to indicate
whether Harvard or Clemson University has higher status. All participants
indicated that Harvard has higher status than Clemson. Furthermore, in
addition to reading that the researcher works as a professor at Harvard (in
the HSI condition) or Clemson (in the MSI condition), participants re-
cruited from Mechanical Turk also read that the researcher received his
PhD from Stanford (in the HSI condition) or Dakota State University (in
the MSI condition). We ran the study again on a sample of undergraduate
participants, without providing information about where the researcher
received his PhD. As explained in footnote 10, the samples showed no
differences in effects, so we combined the two samples to increase our
sample size.
Table 8
Study 4: Model Estimation Results for Predicting Joint Effect of SDO and Researcher’s Gender and Caste on Perceived Credibility
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Participant caste .35 (.18) .17 (.20) .18(.20) .18 (.20) .17 (.20) .17 (.20)
Participant gender .14 (.33) .13 (.31) .12 (.31) .12 (.31) .13 (.31) .13 (.31)
Researcher gender .06 (.15) .07 (.15) .07 (.15) .17 (.21) .17 (.21)
Researcher caste .12 (.15) .12 (.15) .12 (.15) .02 (.21) .02 (.21)
SDO .34(.12) .18 (.17) .21 (.20) .20 (.20) .19 (.23)
Researcher Caste  SDO .22 (.21) .22 (.21) .23 (.21) .25 (.30)
Researcher Gender  SDO .05 (.21) .06 (.21) .03 (.31)
Researcher Caste  Researcher Gender .18 (.30) .18 (.30)
Researcher Caste  Researcher Gender  SDO .03 (.41)
R2 .16 .26 .29 .29 .30 .30
R2 .10 .02 .00 .01 0
Note. N  200. Political ideology was measured using social dominance orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism. For
participant gender, 0  woman, 1  man. For participant caste, 0  low caste, 1  high caste. For researcher gender, 0  woman researcher, 1  man
researcher. For researcher caste, 0  low-caste researcher, 1  high caste researcher.
 p  .05.  p  .01.
Figure 6. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Caste
interaction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which Researcher
Credibility differs significantly between the High Caste and Low Caste
Researcher at p  .05. The outer border of the left shaded area represents
the lowest political ideology score in the sample. Researcher Credibility
differs significantly for individuals embracing egalitarianism at p  .07
level when political ideology  4.89, the maximum observed political
ideology score.
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Results
Table 9 reports means, standard deviations, and correlations for
all variables. We used hierarchical regression to analyze our data.
We entered participant race in Step 1; researcher race (dummy
coded, 0  Black, 1  White), specific status cue (dummy coded,
0  MSI, 1  HSI), and SDO (centered) in Step 2; the two-way
Researcher Race  SDO interaction in Step 3; the two-way
Specific Status  SDO interaction in Step 4; the two-way Re-
searcher Race  Specific Status interaction in Step 5; and the
three-way Researcher Race  Specific Status Cue  SDO inter-
action in Step 6. Table 10 shows the results of the regressions.
Evaluation of researcher credibility. Results of hierarchical
regression revealed a significant three-way Researcher Race 
Specific Status Cue  SDO interaction (R2  .04, p  .001). To
Test Hypothesis 1, we decomposed the significant three-way in-
teraction by specific status cues to see if we could replicate the
Researcher Race  SDO interaction we found in previous studies.
Results of hierarchical regression using only participants from the
MSI condition revealed a significant two-way Researcher Race 
SDO interaction (R2  .13, p  .001). Figure 7 illustrates the
interaction.
Supporting Hypothesis 1, Figure 7 shows that elitists judged the
White researcher as more credible than the Black researcher
(BJN  .31, SE  .16, p  .05), whereas egalitarians judged the
Black researcher as more credible than the White researcher
(BJN  .43, SE  .22, p  .05).
Hypothesis 2 predicts that specific status cues can neutralize the
effect of diffuse status cues and ideological beliefs on credibility
judgments. A hierarchical regression using participants from the
HSI condition revealed that the two-way Researcher Race  SDO
interaction was not significant (R2 0, p .57), thus supporting
Hypothesis 2.
SAT performance. Hierarchical regression using the SAT
percentile score revealed a significant three-way Researcher
Race  SDO  Specific Status interaction (R2  .03, p  .01).
Table 11 shows the results of the regressions. We decomposed the
interaction by the specific status manipulation to examine whether
the presence of the specific status cue attenuated the effects of
diffuse status cues and perceiver political ideology. Hierarchical
regression using participants from the MSI condition revealed a
significant two-way Researcher Race  SDO interaction (R2 
.07, p  .01). Figure 8 graphically illustrates the interaction.
Table 9
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 5
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Participant race 0.76 0.46 —
2. SDO 5.25 1.15 .07 —
3. Researcher credibility 4.95 1.10 .03 .33 —
4. SAT (percentile score) 77.52 21.52 .17 .12 .32 —
Note. N  290. Political ideology was measured using social dominance
orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism.
SAT Scholastic Aptitude Test. For participant race, 0 non-White, 1
White.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Table 10
Study 5: Model Estimation Results for Predicting Joint Effect of SDO and Researcher’s Gender and Race on Perceived Credibility
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Participant race .07 (.14) .15 (.13) .16 (.13) .17 (.13) .18 (.13) .16 (.13)
Researcher race .11 (.12) .10 (.12) .28 (.17) .28 (17) .29 (.17)
Specific status cue .26 (.12) .25 (.12) .43 (.17) .43 (.17) .44 (.17)
SDO .34 (.06) .50 (.08) .50 (.08) .55 (.10) .77 (.11)
Researcher Race  SDO .31 (.11) .31 (.11) .31 (.11) .76 (.16)
Researcher Race  Specific Status Cue .35 (.24) .36 (.24) .35 (.24)
Specific Status Cue  SDO .09 (.11) .53 (.16)
Researcher Race  Specific Status Cue  SDO .85 (.22)
R2 .00 .12 .15 .15 .16 .20
R2 .12 .03 .00 .01 .04
Note. N  290. Political ideology was measured using social dominance orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism. For
participant race, 0  non-White, 1  White. For researcher race, 0  Black researcher, 1  White researcher. For specific status cue, 0  moderate status
institutional affiliation (Clemson), 1  high status institutional affiliation (Harvard). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Figure 7. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Race in-
teraction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which Researcher Cred-
ibility differs significantly between the White and the Black Researcher at
p  .05. The outer border of the left shaded area represents the lowest
political ideology score in the sample and the outer border of the right
shaded area represents the highest political ideology score.
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874 ZHU, AQUINO, AND VADERA
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Figure 8 shows that egalitarians
estimated higher SAT scores for the Black researcher
(BJN  11.37, SE  5.75, p  .05); elitists estimated higher
SAT scores for the White researcher (BJN  7.98, SE  4.04,
p  .05).
Finally, we performed a hierarchical regression using only par-
ticipants in the HSI condition. Results showed a nonsignificant
two-way Researcher Race  SDO interaction (R2  0, p  .49),
thus supporting Hypothesis 2.
General Discussion
Collectively, our studies show that ideological beliefs and status
characteristics of race, gender, or caste jointly predict judgments of
researcher credibility. We also show that a status cue signaling
academic competence can neutralize these effects. Finally, we
show that credibility judgments influence the interpretation of
ambiguous organizational and societal events. Although every
study found evidence for the Status  Ideology interactions,
specific status characteristics failed to uniformly interact with
ideological beliefs to predict credibility judgments. No matter how
we operationalized demographic status, however, the Status 
Ideology interaction consistently explained significant incremental
variance in credibility judgments (.02 to .08).
There is much evidence that antiegalitarian beliefs are related to
negative attitudes and perceptions of disadvantaged and minority
groups (e.g., Levin, Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002;
Pratto & Shih, 2000; Whitley, 1999). The SDO literature has
primarily focused on documenting such biases. Our results largely
corroborate these findings, but we also show that a strong com-
mitment to egalitarianism skews social judgment in the other
direction, albeit in a way that is perhaps more acceptable to
modern democratic sensibilities. What our data cannot reveal is
whether egalitarians evaluated low-status researchers as more
credible because they elevated them and whether they evaluated
high-status researchers as less credible because they devalued
them. Our data can, however, support a motivated reasoning ex-
planation where ideology drives social cognition. Following other
theorists, we argue that both egalitarians and elitists are fundamen-
tally motivated to legitimize the system (Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay &
Jost, 2003) and bring order and coherence (Lerner, 1980) to an
unequal world. Furthermore, our data qualify the argument that
ingroup favoritism is the primary basis for discrimination (Green-
wald & Pettigrew, 2014) as we found that credibility judgments
were the same for study participants who shared demographic
backgrounds with researchers and participants who had different
backgrounds. This result suggests that in some cases, out-group
favoritism might prevail (Jost et al., 2002) with low-status elitists
favoring high-status researchers or high-status egalitarians favor-
ing low-status researchers.
That egalitarians can be biased in their social judgments has
been acknowledged even by professed egalitarians. For example,
liberal social psychologists admitted that they would be biased
against conservative colleagues (Inbar & Lammers, 2012). Simi-
larly, highly egalitarian participants in our studies evaluated mi-
norities and women more favorably, which challenges a lay belief
that people uniformly stigmatize or devalue low-status groups.
Although considerable evidence shows that prejudice and biases
Table 11
Study 5: Model Estimation Results for Predicting Joint Effect of SDO and Researcher’s Gender and Race on Estimated SAT Score
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Participant race 8.22 (2.69) 8.20 (2.69) 8.39 (2.68) 8.49 (2.69) 8.36 (2.70) 8.13 (2.66)
Researcher race 1.51 (2.43) 1.53 (2.41) 3.25 (3.42) 3.19 (3.43) 3.29 (3.38)
Specific status cue 5.60 (2.42) 5.51 (2.41) 7.23 (3.42) 7.14 (3.43) 7.59 (3.38)
SDO 2.67 (1.12) 5.15 (1.62) 5.15 (1.62) 4.49 (1.96) 8.01 (2.24)
Researcher Race  SDO 4.70 (2.22) 4.72 (2.22) 4.80 (2.23) 11.99 (3.17)
Researcher Race  Specific Status Cue 3.43 (4.82) 3.25 (4.84) 3.32 (4.77)
Specific Status Cue  SDO 1.33 (2.23) 5.85 (3.18)
Researcher Race  Specific Status Cue  SDO 13.74 (4.39)
R2 .03 .06 .08 .08 .08 .11
R2 .03 .02 .00 .00 .03
Note. N  290. Political ideology was measured using social dominance orientation (SDO) and a high/low score indicates egalitarianism/elitism. For
participant race, 0  non-White, 1  White. For researcher race, 0  Black researcher, 1  White researcher. For specific status cue, 0  moderate status
institutional affiliation (Clemson), 1  high status institutional affiliation (Harvard). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Figure 8. Regions of significance for Ideology  Researcher Race in-
teraction. Note. Shaded area represents regions in which estimated SAT
score differs significantly between the White and the Black Researcher at
p  .05. The outer border of the left shaded area represents the lowest
political ideology score in the sample and the outer border of the right
shaded area represents the highest political ideology score.
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875ACADEMIC CREDIBILITY
are commonly directed against low-status groups (e.g., Crocker,
Major, & Steele, 1998; Devine, 1989), such prejudices can be
mitigated when people are motivated to consciously avoid bias
(Devine & Monteith, 1999; Plant & Devine, 1998). Our study
shows that they can also go in a different direction if one is highly
committed to a particular ideology.
Some writers have argued that egalitarians are motivated (e.g.,
Aquino, Stewart, & Reed, 2005; Butz & Plant, 2009) to “purge
their minds of stereotypic thoughts when they encounter stereo-
typed others” (Aquino et al., 2005, p. 737). Apparently as their
commitment to egalitarianism becomes extreme, they take another
step and venerate low-status groups above equally capable but
higher-status counterparts. When Lerner (1980) formulated just-
world theory over 30 years ago, he acknowledged this possibility:
It is virtually a cliché in our culture to consider the poverty-
stricken, or even the relatively deprived, as having their own
compensating rewards. They are actually happy in their own
way—carefree, happy-go-lucky, in touch with and able to enjoy
the “simple pleasures” of life (Lerner, 1980, pp. 20–21).
Our model extends Lerner’s observation by making a more
precise prediction about who is likely to engage in compensatory
thinking about low-status groups. Notably, only extreme egalitar-
ians showed evidence of such thinking. Across all our studies, the
Johnson–Neyman points of significance on the SDO measure
showing differences in credibility judgments favoring low-status
researchers showed a mean of 6.02 on a 7-point scale. This result
suggests it is radical egalitarians rather than ideological moderates
who are most susceptible to complementary stereotyping. In com-
parison, the average point of significance was 4.08 on the SDO
measure for judging the high-status researcher as more credible.
One interpretation of this result is that individuals do not need to
be extreme elitists to engage in the more “conventional” form of
status  competence stereotyping predicted by status characteris-
tics theory.
By including ideology into our social judgment model, our
studies corroborate Tetlock’s (2000) assertion that people view the
outcomes of many organizational processes through an ideological
lens. Our studies also contribute to the social influence literature
by identifying conditions under which status cues influence cred-
ibility judgments. Specifically, we found that information about
the researcher’s professional achievement attenuated the bias
against high- or low-status researchers for both egalitarians and
elitists. This finding supports authority and persuasion research
suggesting that people defer to those who actively signal expertise
(Cialdini, 2001).
Limitations and Future Directions
Although we found considerable support for our hypotheses, our
studies have limitations. First, we manipulated three diffuse status
characteristics, but many other status characteristics, such as phys-
ical appearance (Bunderson, 2003), could potentially moderate
ideology effects. Second, we examined only judgments of re-
searcher credibility, although we mentioned that our model should
apply to other evaluative judgments. Third, the time frame was
limited for testing the duration of credibility judgments on inter-
pretations of ambiguous events. Finally, although we speculated
that the process is likely to be largely nonconscious, we did not test
underlying processes.
A logical extension of our research would be to test whether
people distinguish between researcher credibility and trustworthi-
ness. If researchers are to effectively communicate scientific find-
ings, they must also be perceived as trustworthy (e.g., Fiske &
Dupree, 2014; Hovland et al., 1953; Petty & Wegener, 1998); that
is, as having good intentions and integrity (Colquitt, Scott, &
LePine, 2007) beyond capability. A follow-up study would exam-
ine how researcher demographic characteristics and perceiver ide-
ological beliefs interact to influence trust in the researcher, and
how trust might relate to credibility judgments. Future research
could also investigate how ideology interacts with mixed stereo-
types. For example, housewives and the disabled are stereotyped
as incompetent but warm; Black professionals and Asians are
stereotyped as competent but cold (Fiske et al., 2002). If individ-
uals adhere to those stereotypes, they might view Black profes-
sionals and Asians as competent and credible, as in our studies, but
untrustworthy because they lack warmth.
Another future direction would be to contrast SDO and right-
wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) as source of mo-
tivated cognition. Although both SDO and RWA have been shown
to consistently predict intergroup discrimination, they have differ-
ent psychological underpinnings and thus predict different types of
discrimination (Duckitt, 2001). RWA captures the extent to which
individuals view the world as “dangerous, unpredictable, and
threatening”; SDO captures the extent to which individuals view
the world as a “competitive jungle characterized by a ruthless and
amoral Darwinian struggle for survival” (Duckitt, 2001, pp. 50,
51). Consequently, individuals high in RWA judge others based on
positive or negative morality evaluations. In contrast, individuals
high in SDO perceive others based on competence. Those distinc-
tions lead to speculations that RWA may also interact with re-
searcher demographics to predict reactions to the researcher. How-
ever, we expect RWA and the researcher’s demographic
background to cause perceptions that the researcher is more or less
well-intentioned rather than more or less competent.
Practical Implications
Major ranking agencies such as Times Higher Education and
Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) now include faculty diversity as a
measure of institutional quality. Although striving to increase
faculty diversity is laudable, our research suggests that the ideo-
logical commitments of key decision makers could influence how
they pursue diversity goals. For example, imagine that an aca-
demic dean must fill a prestigious chaired position, but objective
criteria show that no candidate is clearly superior. If the dean is
extremely egalitarian, candidates who belong to low-status demo-
graphic groups may be overvalued and candidates from high-status
demographic groups may be undervalued in regard to the same
attributes. An elitist dean would do the opposite. Our studies
suggest that one way to minimize the impact of ideological pref-
erences on social judgment skewing is to provide as many specific
status cues as possible to signal expertise beyond diffuse cues. On
the other hand, organizational policies might cause highly com-
mitted egalitarian or elitist employees to skew their social judg-
ment by placing more weight on certain diffuse cues.
Another practical implication of our study is that it sheds light
on whether and how university students might incorporate what
they learn from academic scholarship. It is reasonable to assume
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that university students bring their preconceptions and ideology to
the classroom. Thus, egalitarian or elitist students might reach
different conclusions about the credibility of faculty members who
belong to low- or high-status groups. To counteract status-driven
biases that might cause students to discredit their pedagogical
claims, professors might use self-promotion and impression man-
agement tactics that call attention to status cues such as academic
pedigrees or awards. In other words, our findings remind us that
what passes for scientific truth often depends more on how, by
whom, and to whom information is presented rather than on
empirical verities revealed by the most carefully controlled and
elegantly designed study.
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